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The term "corporate governance", as is pointed out by Keasey, Thompson & Wright
(1997), was rarely encountered before the 1990s. In more recent times the concept has
frequently appeared in the media and has been the topic of numerous committees of
enquiry in various countries all over the world, including South Africa. The authors,
referred to above, also make the point that the concept defies precise definition because of
the differing opinions over the problems encountered by the modern company. Ultimately
it is the existence of numerous stakeholders in the company, with differing levels of power
and influence, which results in the need for formal structures and policies to balance
stakeholder interests. In adopting such "balancing structures" the following questions
arise. For what end should this 'balancing act' be done? What is the ultimate objective
and which stakeholder is ultimately the king?
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide the reader with a clear understanding of the
concept of corporate governance and what the individual rules of this 'balancing act' are
meant to achieve.
This is accomplished by, in the first chapter, referring to academic research on the reasons
for the development of the corporate governance concept. Four "models of corporate
governance" are described in this section. These "models" serve as a framework for the
evaluation of the second King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (for
convenience referred to as King 11), which was published in March 2002. This first chapter
also provides a short overview of the King Report on Corporate Governance for South
Africa 1994 (Henceforth referred to as King I). The discussion of King I, serves to
illustrate the beginnings of corporate governance in South Africa. In the second chapter,
the focus shifts to the contemporary corporate governance structures and mechanism,
which are aimed at ensuring good governance in modern corporations.
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The second chapter includes a review of the existing research on governance structures
and mechanisms, and whether or not these have been successful in the United Kingdom.
The reader will find that the research is often at odds as to whether governance structures
actually serve their intended purpose. This chapter also provides a detailed overview and
evaluation of governance structures proposed by King 11. This overview will highlight the
development of corporate governance since the publication of the King I and places the
final report in a philosophical context, linking to the discussion in chapter 1.
In the third chapter provides an analysis of a sample of companies listed on the Financial
Services sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the extent to which these
companies are managed in line with contemporary governance structure requirements.
This research demonstrates that although the companies are managed in accordance with
King I, recommendations, King 11 provides additional "challenges" to these companies.
These challenges are elaborated on in chapter four which is a further evaluation of King 11
given the academic research referred to in chapter two and the current reality represented
by the sample of companies referred to in chapter three.
The fifth and final chapter consists of recommendations for improved governance, further
research and a conclusion of the dissertation. The author is of the ultimate view that
stakeholder education and additional publicity around corporate governance is key to
ensuring that the rules of the "balancing act" are adhered to at all times. The overall
conclusion is that an independent rating agency is required in South Africa to publicly rank
companies on their compliance to good corporate governance standards.
1.2 Reasons for Corporate Governance
One could, in very broad terms, trace the concept of corporate governance to the
separation of powers between the owners and the management of the corporation. Blair
(1995), for example, has suggested that the current differing perspectives on corporate
governance are directly related to the fact that theorists disagree greatly over the actual
significance of this separation power between management and the owners. Blair has
accordingly identified four competing views on the problems associated with corporate
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governance and how to improve governance in companies. An understanding of these
four views will contribute to a greater appreciation of the concept of corporate governance.
1.2.1. The Agency Model
The first of these views or models, the Principal -Agent or Agency Model, is grounded on
the premise that markets are efficient and that the role of the corporate manager should be
maximize shareholder value. Proponents argue that the efficiencies in the markets for
capital, managerial skills and corporate control create the best restraint on managerial
discretion. In terms of this model the shareholder voting rights are sufficient to ensure that
management employ their resources efficiently and in the best interests of the company.
Leveraged and management buy-outs, hostile take over bids and executive share options
are all market developments aimed at ensuring that the interests of shareholders are
upheld by management. Supporters of this model acknowledge that corporate
governance failings do occur, but suggest that the factor market and the market for
corporate control best address these failings. Any restrictions on these markets create
inefficiencies and do more harm than good. Supporters of this model are generally in
favour of the introduction of a voluntary code of corporate governance but would object to
any legislative interventions (Blair, 1995).
The separation of ownership and control and the resultant costs associated with the
monitoring of the conflicting rights and obligations is referred to by Fama and Jensen
(1983a) as giving rise to "contracts or internal 'rules of the game' (which) specify the rights
of each agent in the organization".
The establishment of 'rules of the game' to ensure that shareholder interests are promoted
is, in terms of the Agency Model, the purpose of corporate governance. This objective is
also well defined in the definition adopted by, Dockery (2000) as follows:
"An important objective of corporate governance is securing accountability of
corporate management as shareholders' agents who are provided with authority
and incentives to promote wealth-creating strategies." (p. 21).
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This definition is relatively narrow in its view of the responsibilities of management. The
Agency Model, as will be demonstrated in chapter two, is also far narrower in its
underlying philosophy than that which has been adopted by King 11.
This distinction also serves as a basis on which to distinguish the approach, which was
adopted in the United Kingdom, albeit in the 1990s, to that which is currently followed in
South Africa.
1.2.2. The Myopic Market Model
The Myopic Market Model looks at the need for corporate governance entirely differently.
It suggests that the market is not entirely efficient in its valuation of companies' long-term
expenditure (such as R & D and capital investment). This, it is argued, forces managers to
drive short-term interests above long-term objectives in their bid to provide shareholders
with an adequate return. The role of corporate governance in this model is thus to align
the shorter-term interests of management with the longer-term wealth maximizing interests
of shareholders.
In terms of this model market inefficiencies drive the need for corporate governance, the
divergence of shareholder and management interests are a consequence of the market
inefficiency.
Supporters of this model 'are in favour of reforms, which would reduce the ability for
shareholders to exit the company as they have a responsibility of keeping management in
check. In addition to this, the model seeks to encourage long-term relationships between
all stakeholders and to restrict the voting rights of short-term investors. The takeover
process should also be restricted. This model thus advocates reforms that the principal
agent model is adamant should be avoided.
1.2.3 The Abuse of Executive Power Model
The abuse of executive power model holds that the division between corporate ownership
and control results in an excess of power being vested in management, some of whom are
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inclined to abuse this power and promote their own interests to the detriment of the
company. According to this model the institutional restraints on managerial power are
insufficient to prevent managerial abuse of power. This theory has received support
recently from a study conducted by Kay and Silberston (1995) who argue that the majority
of listed companies are managed by a board, which is a self-perpetuating oligarchy.
These authors have compared the senior management of listed companies to the
governing elite of political dictatorships. Kay and Silberston (1995) therefore, argue for
legislative intervention in order to limit the powers of senior management. They support
the statutory limitation of the term of office of the chief executive officer and legislation that
would ensure the independence and power of the non-executive director.
1.2.4. The Stakeholder Model
The Stakeholder Model's central theme is a direct challenge to the Agency Model. Its
central theme is that the role of the corporation should be far broader than the
maximization of shareholder wealth. Instead the corporation should have the interests of
all long-term stakeholders at heart. These stakeholders include: customers, suppliers,
employees and society. The role of corporate governance should be to ensure that the
interests of all stakeholders are balanced and that there is no long-term domination by any
one of these stakeholders.
Although the philosophy of this theory is a challenge to the Agency Model, which has the
promotion of shareholder wealth as its central tenet, Hill & Jones (1992) have suggested
that a more inclusive approach may not actually be at odds with a shareholder focused
model. In terms of their view the Stakeholder Model would be complementary in nature to
the Agency Model. (One may think of this as a Stakeholder-Agency Model).
The underlying premise of the Stakeholder Model is that if due consideration and the
ethical treatment of all long term stakeholders is the best strategy to ensure long term
profits, then the shareholders should encourage managers to follow this strategy. Such a
strategy would then, by definition, also be in the interests of shareholders and lead to the
creation of long-term shareholder wealth. The following definition of corporate
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governance, which is taken from a recent World Bank Report, reflects the philosophy of
the stakeholder model:
"Corporate Governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic
and social goals and between individual and communal goals... the aim is to align
as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society."
(Cadbury, 1999).
The most recognized public contributions to the topic of corporate governance in the South
Africa have undoubtedly been the reports of the King Committee on Corporate
Governance for South Africa. The focus of this dissertation will be devoted to these
reports.
1.3. King 1- In the Beginning
This section is aimed to provide an overall background context, specifically, to corporate
governance in South Africa and to identify whether South African recommendations on
corporate governance issues have differed from those in the United Kingdom. This will,
ultimately, serve to provide an understanding of how corporate governance has developed
since 1994 to the publication of the second King Report on Corporate Governance for
South Africa, in 2002.
The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa was first published in 1994.
This report followed shortly after the Cadbury report (1992) in the United Kingdom. In the
United Kingdom, the Cadbury report and various other related reports were later combined
to form, what is now known as, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance. The
Combined Code is now an annexure to the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules and
listed British companies are required in their annual financial statements to indicate the
extent to which they have complied with the Combined Code during their accounting
period. (Gronow, 2001). King" was published in March 2002; this study aims to focus
predominantly on King " and to evaluate this in terms of the research, which has been
conducted on corporate governance by various academic writers.
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The media attention paid to the topic has resulted in a fair degree of debate as to what
exactly is meant by corporate governance. The difficulty in defining corporate governance
is also linked to the differing opinions on its purpose, as discussed in section 1.2 above.
Keasey and Wright define corporate governance as the concerning "the enhancement of
corporate performance via the supervision, or monitoring, of management performance
and ensuring the accountability of management to shareholders and other stakeholders."
(1997, p.2).
A reading of the founding statement of the Cadbury report (1992) also provides some
insight into the purpose and need for corporate governance measures. The Cadbury
Committee was set up due to the concerns of the sponsors at the "perceived low level of
confidence both in financial reporting and in the ability of auditors to provide the
safeguards, which the users of the company reports sought and expected." (Cadbury,
1992, p. 14). In terms of this report corporate governance was defined as "the system by
which companies are directed and controlled." (Cadbury, 1992, p.15).
The above purpose distinguished this report from both King reports in that the Cadbury
report focused primarily on financial governance issues as opposed to the broader
corporate governance concerns.
Not surprisingly, the mandate of the King I was much wider than that of Cadbury. With the
democratization of the South Africa the King Committee also had to take account of
special circumstances, particularly the emergence of a new class of entrepreneur in
previously disadvantaged communities (King, 1994). Referring to the Cadbury report, the
following extract from King I reflects not only the broader mandate but also the recognition
of the significance of multiple stakeholders in business:
"The Cadbury recommendations involved the financial aspects of corporate
governance and focused on integrity and shareholder dominance. While it is of the
utmost importance that companies operate form a base of integrity, we believe that
the focus must be on a participative entrepreneurial approach rather than a
dominant one" (King, 1994, p.5).
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The South African context, at the time, thus distinguished this first report from similar
reports in the United Kingdom in that the role of enterprise was given more emphasis in
South Africa. This was often referred to by the committee and clearly influenced the
recommendations.
In the following sub-sections an overview will be provided of the governance structures
recommended by King I.
1.3.1. Board Structure
The first King report recommended that the board of directors should consist of at least an
equal number of executive and non -executive directors. It was also recommended that
the chairman should be a non -executive director.
The committee also considered the benefits of a two-tier board structure but rejected this
due to the expense of such a structure and the opinion that the unitary board structure was
able to achieve the objectives of a two-tier board structure.
It was also recommended that the board should meet at least quarterly.
1.3.2. The Non -executive Directors
This category of director was defined as a director who is not an employee of the company
involved in the day-to-day management of the business. The King Committee went on to
specify that the non-executive director should be independent and could therefore not be
a member of the company pension fund or medical aid fund to which the company
contributes. The committee recommended that each company should have a minimum of
three non -executive directors including the chairman. It was further felt that such
directors should not be appointed for a specific term but that the tenure should be
dependant on the performance of the individual and thus at the discretion of the board.
The committee referred to directors serving a "silent apprenticeship for six months to one
year" before actively participating in board activities (Ibid, p. 12).
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King I did not elaborate on the requirement of independence for non-executive directors.
The Cadbury report by contrast, defined independence as follows:
"..apart from their directors' fees and shareholdings, they should be independent of
Management and free from any business or other relationship which could
materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment" (Cadbury,
1992, p.22).
King I listed four important functions of non -executive directors,
Firstly that they should "bring their special expertise and knowledge to bear on the
strategy, enterprise, innovative ideas and business planning of the company" (King, 1994,
p. 6). Secondly, the responsibility to monitor and review the performance of the executive
management. Thirdly, the role of resolving conflict of interest situations, for example those
involving executive remuneration, succession and hostile takeovers. Finally, they function
as a check and balance to the executive directors (Ibid, p.6).
The King I recommendations should be seen in the unique South African context of 1994.
This context was one of a new democracy eager to enter the world stage yet facing a
serious shortage of skilled labour. In certain places one may question wisdom of the
inclusive approach adopted by King I. An example of this is the concept of an
"apprenticeship", as it is referred to and discussed in the recommendation. The
apprenticeship requires newly appointed directors to merely observe boardroom practices
as opposed to actively participating in debates and discussion. Where one has an equal
number of executive and non -executive directors a silent "apprentice" non -executive
director would result in the dominance of the executives. In addition to this the committee
referred, in earlier paragraphs (p.11), to South African company law and stated that, in
relation to fraud or negligent and reckless conduct, non-executive directors and executive
directors would be held equally accountable to shareholders. The silent apprentice, it is
submitted, would not be able to rely on an apprenticeship as a defense for his failure to
exercise corrective action where such was needed. This has been omitted from King I.
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1.3.3. The Chairman and CEO
The committee recommended that it was preferable that the role of chairman should be
separated from that of Chief Executive Officer. The conclusion reached by the committee
was that the chairman should be an independent and non -executive director. The
committee recognized that in many instances, due to the skills shortage in South Africa,
the separation of the roles would not be possible. It was suggested that where this was
the case the non-executive directors would have an added responsibility to ensure that the
chairman was supportive of proper deliberation and that he encouraged debate.
1.3.4. Remuneration Committees
King I was in favour of the appointment of remuneration committees consisting of a non-
executive chairman and a majority of non-executive directors. This recommendation may
be contrasted with that of the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) committees.
Cadbury called for remuneration committees comprised mainly or wholly of non-executive
directors, while Greenbury took this a step further by stipulating that such committees
should consist only of non-executive directors.
1.3.5. Nomination Committees
The King I report stated that the committee was opposed to the institution of nomination
committees because it felt that the entire board should be involved in the appointment of
directors. The committee also questioned the practicality of recommending a nomination
committee consisting of non -executive directors in a South African environment
characterized by a skills shortage.
The committee went on to recognize that the selection process in the past had often been
wrong and that this had lead to a lack of diversity in board appointments, in terms of both
race and gender.
Although the importance of "the courage to express... independent thought" (King, 1994,
p.15) is referred to by the committee there was not much recognition of the benefit of
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diversity of thought which often accompanies diversity of race, culture, ethnicity and
gender.
1.3.6. Audit Committees
The King I recommended that all listed companies should have audit committees. It was
further recommended that these committees should be chaired by a non-executive director
and should consist of, at least one other and preferably, a majority of non-executive
directors. It was also recommended that the financial director, external and internal
auditors should attend all audit committee meetings. The committee also voiced the view
that the membership of the audit committee should be published in the annual report of the
company.
It is interesting to note that the publication of the membership of this committee was a
specific recommendation and that no similar recommendation was made for the
remuneration and nomination committees.
1.3.7. Compliance to King I in 1995
Pullinger (1995) conducted research into the acceptance of the Cadbury Committee
recommendations amongst the Financial Mail Top 300 South African companies and a
sample of financial services professionals. Although the research was conducted prior to
the actual publication of King I it is interesting to note that it was found that the majority of
respondents were broadly in favour of the Cadbury recommendations. It was found
however that the actual compliance to Cadbury (the British code), by the sample of South
African companies, was relatively low. Only 40.3% of respondents, for example, had a
non-executive chairman while only 50.8% confirmed a separation of the roles of chairman
and CEO. In terms of overall board structure only 62.9% met the requirement of a
minimum of three non-executive directors.
Pullinger's research into the governance of director remuneration revealed even lower
compliance to Cadbury. Only 29.8% of respondents reported having a remuneration
committee, made up wholly or mainly of non-executive directors, in order to make
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recommendations on executive's remuneration. Not surprisingly an even lower
percentage (9.7%) of respondents confirmed that the composition of their remuneration
committees were be disclosed in the directors' reports.
Although the above research by Pullinger was conducted before the publication of King I, a
tabular analysis (see table 2.3.7) of the Cadbury recommendations and those ultimately
published in King I, reveal that the requirements were very similar. The statistics quoted in
Pullinger's research are thus relatively accurate in measuring compliance to King 1in 1995.
The research conducted by Pullinger in 1995 has contributed to the motivation to
establish, from current research, the extent to which a small sample of South African
companies are in compliance with King 11, which has set standards even higher than those
set by Cadbury and King I almost a decade ago.
1.4. Motivation for the Study
The main motivation for this study is the need to understand corporate governance both at
a practical level and in terms of academic research. Initial interest was sparked by the
high profile given to corporate governance issues both locally and in the international
environment. The corporate failures of local companies such as, Regal Treasury Bank Ltd
(2001), Saambou Bank Ltd (2002), Unifer Ltd (2002), Fedsure Ltd (2001) and Leisurenet
Ltd (1999) have placed corporate governance issues in the limelight. This has also
occurred in the international environment with the recent collapse of Enron (2001) in the
United States and the conviction of the accounting firm Andersen Consulting for not
fulfilling its functions as an auditor of the firm.
Unfortunately it is the researcher's impression that the South African media have been
very quick to "jump on the corporate governance bandwagon" in an attempt to increase
circulation without providing the reader with a clear understanding of the topic.
In addition the media coverage devoted to the publication of the second King Report in
March 2002, had not paid any attention to academic research conducted into corporate
governance, particularly the structures, and the extent to which these have been
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scientifically tested in order to establish whether they have been successfully employed in
other countries.
There also appears to be very little published academic and business research on
corporate governance in South Africa. Certainly there is less than that, published in the
United Kingdom and United States.
1.5. Objectives of the Study
The purpose of this study is to conduct qualitative research into the topic of corporate
governance in order to obtain a clear understanding of the topic. This research will thus
investigate the development of corporate governance in South Africa since the introduction
of the first King Report on Corporate Governance in 1994. Once the objective of gaining a
thorough understanding of corporate governance structures has been achieved, the
objective is to practically test the extent to which these structures are employed in a small
sample of companies listed on the South African financial services sector of the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. This last part of the study is focused on specific elements
of corporate governance including the following:
• Structure of the Board of Directors
• Separation of the Roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board
• The Existence and Structure of Audit Committees
• The Existence and Structure of Remuneration Committees
• The Existence and Structure of Nomination Committees
• The Existence and Role Played by Institutional Shareholders.
The practical study referred to involves six listed financial services companies. The
companies were selected on a convenience-sampling basis and excluded the five large
South African banks. The aim of the this study is to determine the extent to which the
companies selected had governance structures in place, which complied to the second
King report, although this had not yet been published.
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1.6. Limitations of Study
This is a qualitative research study into the corporate governance structures generally and
a investigation the structures employed by a small sample of companies listed in the
Financial Services Sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The findings are limited
to the selected sample of companies as the sample is small and a convenience based
sampling strategy was employed. The study is also limited in the sense that the
governance structures of the sample companies are investigated over a relatively short
period, namely three years. Above limitations aside, the study provides a valuable
analysis of contemporary South African corporate governance structures and draws
comparisons to those that have been recommended in the United Kingdom by the
Cadbury Report.
1.7. Structure of Study
The second chapter provides a review of the existing research on governance structures
and mechanisms, and whether or not these have been successful in the United Kingdom.
In this chapter, the author also provides a detailed overview and evaluation of governance
structures proposed by the second King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa
(for convenience referred to as King 11), which was published in March 2002. This
overview highlights the development of corporate governance since the publication of the
King I. It will also serve to place the final report in a philosophical context, linking to the
discussion in chapter 1.
The third chapter will provide an analysis of a sample of companies listed on the Financial
Services sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and the extent to which these
companies are managed in line with contemporary governance structure requirements.
The fourth chapter will provide a further evaluation of King 11 given the academic research
referred to in chapter two and the current reality represented by the sample of companies
referred to in chapter three.
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The fifth and final chapter will consist of recommendations for improved governance,
further research and a conclusion of the dissertation.
1.8. Summary
There are four models proposing different reasons for corporate governance. These are
the Agency Model, which favours shareholders; the Myopic Market Model, which regards
the capital market as inefficient in its valuation of companies; the Abuse of Executive
Power Model, which has a "directors' watchdog view" of corporate governance and the
Stakeholder Model, which seeks to balance the interests of all stakeholders. These
models may serve as a means of understanding the actual objectives of corporate
governance and are not necessarily at odds with one another. The objectives of King I
were to ensure that all stakeholders' interests are given sufficient recognition by
management of the company. The governance structures recommended by King I were
designed to take into consideration South Africa's burgeoning democracy and the need to
encourage enterprise.
The following chapter will provide an overview of the governance structures recommended
by the second King report.
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Chapter 2
King 11 and Corporate Governance Structures
2.1. Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to provide, both a context to, and clear understanding of,
the second King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2002). This is
achieved by firstly identifying the underlying philosophy of King 11, in terms of the models
adopted by Blair (1995), referred to in section 1.2. The second part of this chapter will
create a time related context by identifying the developments, in this report, which have
taken place since the publication of the first King Report on Corporate Governance for
South Africa in 1994. This should give the reader an understanding of the direction in
which South African corporate governance is moving. The final part of this chapter will be
devoted to an overview of the actual governance structures recommended by King 11.
The overall intention of this chapter is to provide a basis from which to evaluate the
existing structures adopted by the sample of financial services companies selected by the
author and to be able to critically evaluate the recommendations of King 11, against the
research literature which has been discussed in chapter one and the structures adopted by
the sample of companies. The critical evaluation will be conducted in chapter four.
2.2. The Philosophy of King 11
Reference was made in chapter one, in comparing the mandate of King I to that of
Cadbury, that the mandate of the former mentioned was to consider far broader groups of
stakeholders than the shareholders. This "multiple stakeholder" philosophy has been
continued and expanded upon by King 11. This broader consideration of all stakeholders is
found in King 11 making extensive recommendations on triple bottom line reporting. In fact,
the most recent King Report goes far further than its UK predecessors by, not only
recognizing all stakeholders but, also acknowledging the cultural context of the corporate
governance regime. The African context is recognized in section four of the report, which
is devoted to "Integrated Sustainability Reporting". This section has chapters on;
"Stakeholder Relations", "Safety, Health and the Environment" and "Social and
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Transformation Issues" including Black Economic Empowerment. The section is
commenced with the well-known African proverb: " 'Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu' (I am
because you are, you are because we are.)" which clearly reveals an understanding of the
South African context in which the recommendations have been made (King, 2002, p. 91).
It is thus clear from an overall reading of the report that the model adopted by King 11 is a
Stakeholder based model. The report places great emphasis on the means by which good
corporate governance will be enforced. There is, within this context, a significant role for
an internal audit department in monitoring the company's adherence to good governance
principles. Section 6 of the report is devoted entirely to "Compliance and Enforcement".
This illustrates that the recommendations made in the report have not merely been set as
'isolated guidelines;' the committee has actually paid attention to ways in which they can
be enforced. This is a bold step and a significant departure from corporate governance
codes in other countries.
The philosophy adopted by King 11 is also in keeping with the Principles For Corporate
Governance in the Commonwealth (1999). The Commonwealth corporate governance
guidelines adopt what is referred to as an "inclusive approach" (1999, 3). In addition to
this the guidelines specifically refer to the danger of corporate governance principles
stifling "or being at the expense of enterprise and profitability" (1999, 4). Although this
issue has not received much emphasis in King 11 the theme was clearly emphasized in
King I. The inclusive approach adopted by King 11, it is believed, is sufficient to recognize
the specific needs of South Africa, a developing African country, with the needs to promote
high levels of corporate integrity, such that it is able to attract valuable foreign investment,
and at the same time promote entrepreneurial spirit.
2.3. The Transition from King I to King 11
The period between the publication of King I in 1994 and King 11 in 2002 is characterized
by a rapid growth in information technology and the accompanying collapse of the so
called "dot -com" companies all over the world. The intervening period has also seen the
democratization of South Africa and an increased accessibility of the country to global
markets and foreign investment. The period has also seen the introduction of a great deal
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of legislation aimed at restoring the inequalities of the past. The above socio-political
issues have contributed to the adoption of a broad stakeholder based governance regime,
which balances the need for enterprise with the socio-political needs of South Africa. It is
also worth noting that the 'lack of sufficiently skilled people' to assume directorships,.which
was used as an excuse to temper the recommendations in King I, has been dropped from
King 11. In fact, the following statement is made in King 11 (2002):
liThe perceived lack of available and sufficiently experienced directors in our
economy should not be a reason or excuse for boards to seek to constitute the
majority of their non-executive directors as individuals independent of management
and the company" (47, 3).
There is also the realization that for South Africa to be internationally competitive the
standard of governance needs to be world class. There is reference in King 11 to a
McKinsey & Co. Investor Opinion Survey which established, in June 2000, that 84% of
global institutional investors were willing to pay a premium for the shares of a company
characterized by good governance over a financially comparable company with less
satisfactory governance (2002, p.13). In emerging countries, which were perceived to
have, generally, poor governance practices this premium was found to be as high as 22%
to 27%.
Evidence of the effect of international competition and acceptance of the benefits of a
good governance regime is found in the trend of large South African corporations such as
Old Mutual Plc, Anglo American Plc, South African Breweries Plc and Didata Plc deciding
to select the London Stock Exchange (LSE) as their primary listing. Although these large
companies may have been motivated primarily by their need to raise foreign capital, the
fact that the LSE has an extremely progressive corporate governance code must have
played a positive role. This may have been a dual role in that it would attract both
investors (representing capital) and large corporations who realize that good governance
and friendly capital markets keep the same company.
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The international competition, thus contributed to King 11 paying more careful attention to
the requirement of independence on the part of non-executive directors and devoting an
entire section, comprising eight chapters, of the report to "Compliance and Enforcement"
(King, 2002, p.142). The report currently represents the most progressive and inclusive
corporate governance code in the world.
The general South African regulatory environment has also gone through huge
transformation over the period in question in order to meet international standards.
Amongst other developments:
• The listing requirements of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange were improved in
1995 and 2000,
• Recommendations for statutory amendments contained in King I were included in
the Companies Act 61 of 1973.
• The Insider Trading Act was promulgated in 1998,
• And numerous amendments were brought about to the Banks Act 90 of 1990 in
order to enforce stricter governance practices for banks. In 2000 for example it
became mandatory for banks to have a non-executive as chairman of the audit
committee.
The approach adopted by King 11 is also characterized by the belief in "regulation by the
adoption of the philosophy of disclosure" (2002, p.147). As will be discussed later, with
reference to academic research conducted in the United Kingdom, this philosophy may not
actually "deter the incidence of malpractice and excessive executive rewards" (2002,
p.147).
Inspite of, what may amount, in the above, to the over-emphasis of disclose as a means of
"justifying" corporate managerial behaviour, King 11 has made a significant positive
contribution to South African corporate governance. This has not only been achieved in
the substantive detail of the report but also in the way in which the report was constructed
in that the draft report was published in July 2001 when public comments were invited with
the final report making its appearance in March 2002.
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Table 2.1
Comparison of Corporate Governance Codes
King I King 11 Cadbury Report Hermes Investment Management
Board Equal number of executives and Majority of Non -executive Board should consist of a Boards should consist of a strong core of
Structure non-executives. Chairman should members with sufficient minimum of 3 NEDs. Of these independent NEDs. The ratio of
be a non-executive. Minimum of two independent directors. Chairman the majority should be executives to NEDs is for the board to
NEDs. Directors should not have a should be independent NED. No independent. Appointment for a determine with shareholder approval.
specific term of office. Office at specific term of appointment of specified term. No service NEDs service contract not to exceed 10
discretion of board. Silent NEDs. Executive director service contracts for more than 3 years years. Directors to have one year rolling
apprenticeship for new directors. contract not to exceed 3 years. without shareholder approval. contracts. One new NED to join board
Board to meet at least once a every 3 years.
quarter.
Chairman & Should be separate, unless Should be separate Should be separate. Should be separate. Is also against CEO
CEO justification for combining exists. becoming chairman in the same company.
Audit Comprise at least two NEDs. Minimum two independent NEDs, Minimum of three members, No comments on this sub- committee
Committee Meetings include financial director, chairman to be independent non - confined to NEDs of which the appear in code.
external audit partner and internal executive and not the chairman of majority should be independent.
audit. the board.
Remuneration Should advise on non -executive & To consist entirely or mainly of To consist wholly or mainly of To consist of only independent non-
Committee executive remuneration. No separate independent NEDs independent NEDs. Disclosure executives. Remuneration report should
disclosure of remuneration only of chairman & highest paid be put to vote at AGM. Remuneration to
executive & non-executive split. director's remuneration. be aligned to shareholder returns.
Nomination Not recommended appointment of Only NEDs, of which independent Majority of NEDs under To comprise minimum of three directors.
Committee directors a matter for entire board directors should be majority. chairmanship of chairman of the Majority should be independent.
consideration. Chaired by board chairman. board or independent NED. Chairman of board & senior independent
NED should always be members.
Chairman of committee should be NED.
(Note: NED refers to non-executive director)
2.4. Evaluation of King 11 Corporate Governance Structures
This section provides an evaluation of King 11 in terms of academic research on the topic of
corporate governance. The evaluation is also comparative in nature in that the
recommendations in the codes referred to in table 2.1 above are compared to those of the
King Committee. The evaluation focuses, mainly, on the governance structures
recommended by King 11 (2002) and those recommended by Cadbury (1992).
2.4.1. Composition of the Board
In the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct contained in King 11 (2002) it is
recommended that:
"Companies should be headed by an effective board that can both lead and control
the company. The board should comprise a balance of executive and non-
executive directors, preferably with a majority of non-executive directors, of whom
sufficient should be independent of management so that shareowner interests
(including minority interests) can be protected" (2002, 23-24).
The report goes on to recommend that the appointment of directors should take place in a
transparent and formal process. This appointment process, it is recommended, should
remain the responsibility of the board as a whole and, where appropriate, take place with
the assistance of a nomination committee (2002, 24).
With regard to the composition of the board the report goes on to call for the staggered
rotation of board members and emphasizes the importance of continuity for the board.
The staggered rotation by board members is not discussed in much detail. It understood
to mean that directors should remain in office but hold varying portfolios over their period
of tenure. If this interpretation is correct this far short of the drastic recommendation
adopted by Hermes Investment Management (2001) which calls for the rotation of non-
executive directors on the basis of the exit and replacement of at least one director every
three years. (Table 2.1 above provides are more detailed comparative analysis of the King
11 and Hermes recommendations).
King 11, it is submitted, has correctly identified the crucial considerations in board
composition, which are to; balance the introduction of diversity, ensure independent and
fresh thinking and the need for smooth continuity. It is submitted that to create a board
which varies too frequently in its composition would in fact be harmful to good governance.
This would certainly be the case if one where to apply the principles of the Agency Model
which emphasizes the control aspects associated with access to information and
particularly the imbalance that exists in this regard between executive, and non-executive
directors and shareholders on the other hand.
King 11 has distinguished between three classes of directors.
Firstly, the class of the executive director. This class comprises those directors who are
involved in the day-to-day management of the enterprise. Such directors are usually full
time salaried employees of the company or one of its subsidiaries. Secondly, the class of
non-executive director that would consist of those directors who are not in the employment
of the company and are not involved in the day-to-day management of the company. Non-
executive directors would include those individuals who are employees of a holding
company of the company concerned. The category would also include those individuals
who are employees of a sister company of the company concerned. Finally, the class of
independent director. This class is defined as consisting of non-executive directors who
comply with a strict definition of independence. This "independence test" requires the
director should have absolutely no connection to the company other than the office of
directorship. The definition excludes the non-executive director who holds office as a
"representative of a shareholder who has the ability to control or significantly influence
management" (2002, 25, i). In addition to this the definition requires that the independent
should "not (have) been employed by the company or the group of which it currently forms
part, in any executive capacity for the preceding three financial years" (2002, 25, ii).
The concept of independent director is not unique to King 11 as it is also found in the
Cadbury Report (1992). It is worth noting, however. that the definition adopted by Cadbury
is not as stringent and clearly set out as that in King 11, in fact, the UK report stipulates that
"it is for the board to decide in particular cases whether this definition is met." (22, 4.12).
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Granting such a wide discretion to the board may defeat the purpose of requiring that
independent directors should be elected to the board.
The Cadbury Report (1992) does however provide for additional protection in ensuring that
non-executives have a "strong voice". In terms of the Cadbury proposals this comes in the
form of the senior non-executive director. The senior non-executive is to play a significant
role in the performance appraisals of the board and chairman. King 11, however, does not
introduce the British concept of the senior non-executive director.
The requirement of independence of non-executive directors has in recent years received
greater emphasis internationally with the test of independence becoming stricter and
stricter. Hermes Investment Management for example have developed the following test
of independence:
".. to be independent a NED must not:
• Be or have been an employee of the company
• Serve as a director for more than 10 years or be over 70 years of age
• Represent significant shareholders or other single interest groups (eg supplier,
creditor)
• Receive an income from the company other than NED fees
• Participate in the company's share option or performance-related remuneration
schemes
• Have conflicting or cross directorships
• Have any other significant financial of personal tie to the company or its
management which could interfere with the director's loyalty to shareholders"
(2001, 2.3.).
2.4.2. Separation of the Roles of Chairman and Chief Executive
King" has called for a clear separation of responsibilities at the head of the company to
ensure that "no one individual has unfettered powers of decision making" (2002, 24, 2.3.1).
The committee has gone on to recommend that the chairman should be an independent
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non-executive director. (Ibid, 2.3.2). In addition to this it is recommended that different
individuals should hold the roles of chairperson and chief executive officer. What is
interesting to note, however, is that King 11, acknowledges that the roles may, in
exceptional circumstances, reside in one director. Where this is the case, King 11,
recommends that there should either be an independent non-executive director serving as
deputy chairman or a high proportion of independent non-executive director in the board
composition. The responsibility is placed on the company to justify the combination of the
roles each year in its annual report (Ibid, 24, 2.3.4).
In South African board structures it is very common to find that the non-executive director,
and often the chairman, is a retired executive of the company. One would be justified in
questioning the independence of such directors when they have served, often for
numerous years, as executives in the company. Of the various codes that have been
studied, that of Hermes is strictest in this regard. The Hermes code specifically
disqualifies a director who has, at any time, acted in an executive capacity for the
company from becoming the non-executive chairman. As mentioned above King 11 would
regard an executive as qualifying as a non-executive in the 'independence test' after a
period of three years of no association with the company.
2.4.3. Audit Committees
In the Code of Corporate Practice and Conduct of King 11 it is recommended that "at a
minimum, each board should have an audit and a remuneration committee" (2002, 29,
2.7.5). King 11 provides further recommendations with regard to this sub-committee of the
main board. It is stipulated that the chairman of the audit committee should be an
independent non-executive director and not the chairman of the main board. It is also
recommended that the membership of the audit committee should be disclosed in the
annual report of the company.
The King I had identified the following five main areas of responsibility for these
committees:
• Review of the internal control structure of the company including financial control,
accounting and reporting systems,
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• Review the internal audit function,
• Liaison with external auditors
• Monitoring the compliance of the company with legal requirements
• Monitoring compliance to the company's code of conduct.
The roles and functions of the audit committee in ensuring good governance is expanded
in King 11 by a section in the report on "Accounting and Auditing" and a section on the
"Internal Audit Department" of the company. King I has also paid attention to the role of
the audit committee in ensuring that the external auditors are independent of the company.
The view expressed by King 11 is that the provision of the non-audit functions by the
accounting firm, which is the external auditor, should not necessarily disqualify the firm
from fulfilling the audit function (134, 8). It is the responsibility of the audit committee to
evaluate the independence of the firm on a "case-by-case basis, thereby preserving a
company's ability to select its external auditor for non-audit services, if, in the
circumstances, that is the best choice for the company and the investors" (134, 9). (This
same issue has received much attention in the United States in the failure of Enron and
the role of the Anderson group in the provision of both audit and consulting services).
The approached adopted by King 11 is to clearly define the responsibility of ensuring
selection of an independent auditing firm in the hands of the audit committee. This task
would involve establishing the overall functions and services provided by the firm, which
has been selected, and knowledge of the services which of these services have been
obtained from the firm by the company or its subsidiaries.
2.4.4. Remuneration Committees
The second King Committee's Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct (2002) has
raised the stakes in this controversial area by recommending that the remuneration
committee should "consist entirely or mainly of independent non-executive directors"
(2002, 26). In addition to this it is recommended that this committee should be chaired by
an independent non-executive director (/bid). King 11 has also recommended that
"companies should disclose the earnings, share options, restraint payments and all other
benefits of each individual director" (2002, 57, 11).
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This aspect of corporate governance is probably the most controversial aspect. It is one,
which receives a huge amount of publicity. The establishment of a remuneration
committee is thought by corporate governance proponents to result in two levels of
governance. Firstly to more closely align the remuneration of the directors with the
interests of the shareholder, usually by the introduction of incentivised pay, and secondly,
to serve as a check on the level of pay awarded to directors. The second point is based
on the view that the directors should not placed in a position where they have a conflict of
interests in that they establish their own salaries while at the same time represent the
interests of the company. The above reasons for establishing remuneration committees
are more closely associated to the Agency and Abuse of Executive Power Models of
corporate governance. It may also be argued that linking executive remuneration more
closely to overall corporate performance is in the interests of all stakeholders, including
employees, society and shareholders.
The on-going pursuit of establishing a closer link between corporate performance and
executive remuneration has been the topic of much research in both academic institutions
and in business generally. In research first published in 1993, Main & Johnston examined
the role of remuneration committees in large publicly held UK companies. The
researchers found that 30% of their sample reported having.a remuneration committee. In
addition to this it was found the existence of a remuneration committee had no positive
impact on incentive pay structures. In the regression analysis which was conducted Main
and Johnston also sought to determine whether the existence of a publicly declared
remuneration committee had any influence on the level of CEO pay. The authors found
that there was a statistically significant increase in the levels of CEO pay associated with
the introduction of remuneration committees. Of further concern, to proponents in favour
of this corporate governance structure, was the finding that the significance of the above
relationship only decreased slightly with the introduction of the variable of, 'ratio of non-
executive directors to total directors' on the committee. This ratio also had no influence on
the structure of executive remuneration and the level of incentivistation. This would seem
to imply that non-executive directors failed to keep executive remuneration in check.
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Probably the most surprising finding of the above research was that the presence of the
CEO on the remuneration committee had no statistically significant bearing on the level of
CEO pay. It was, however, established that the presence of the CEO on the remuneration
committee had a significant impact where the CEO was also the chairman of the board
and the highest paid director.
On the brighter side, Main and Johnston (1993) conclude that their research findings do
not represent the basis of a case against remuneration committees. Instead they are of
the view that their findings point to the significance of the selection and composition of the
committee and board. The authors suggest that the role of the nomination committee in
the selection of non-executive directors (and preferably independent non-executives) is an
essential component in establishing an effective remuneration committee.
Conyon (1995) has suggested that the research conducted by Main and Johnston does
not point to remuneration committees contributing to pay increases. Conyon suggests that
there are two reasons why this conclusion cannot be supported by the research of Main
and Johnston. Firstly the data relied on by Main and Johnston was cross sectional in
nature, meaning that it was confined to a particular year. It cannot thus account for firm
specific effects. Secondly, a problem of reverse causation may be present in that the
companies which are more innovative are likely to be high performing and thus more likely
to pay their directors more and also more likely to adopt the practise of remuneration
committees.
Ezzamel and Watson (1997a) conducted research amongst a sample of 199 companies
from The Times Top 1000 list in the UK. The study was conducted shortly after the
Cadbury Committee published its recommendations that public companies should
establish remuneration committees made up of non -executive directors tasked to ensure
that the remuneration of executives is linked to both corporate performance and increases
in shareholder value.
The purpose of the study was mainly to establish whether executive remuneration was
more closely linked to corporate performance and the creation of shareholder wealth or
whether external market forces were better predictors of remuneration levels. Ezzamel &
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Watson have established that executive pay level are mainly influenced by company size
(proportion of non-executive directors is highly correlated with company size), and that
external executive remuneration market comparisons are far more significant in explaining
levels of remuneration than company performance. (p. 85). In addition to this the
existence of institutional shareholders and separation of the roles of chairman and chief
executive also had no impact on the growth rate of executive remuneration over the
sample period (Ezzamel &Watson, 1997a).
This seems to support earlier research conducted by Conyon (1995), in which it was found
that although ownership concentration and control limited the level of executive
remuneration, these variables have no influence on the increase rate of remuneration.
Ezzamel and his colleague also raised the question as to whether "strong social influence
considerations" (Ezzamel & Watson 1997a p.71) play a role in setting the level of
remuneration granted by such committees. The argument is, basically, that non-
executives sitting on remuneration committees are extremely likely to use their level of
remuneration in their own companies as a gauge of reasonableness.
The authors found that the external executive remuneration market comparisons also play
a significant role in the remuneration growth rate of executives in that executives, that
were found to be "underpaid" in the previous financial year, were more likely to receive
larger increases in the subsequent year. This is referred to as the "bidding -up hypothesis
in that remuneration committees are thought to bid up the level of remuneration placing
greater significance on retaining human resources as opposed to keeping executive
remuneration in check (Ezzamel &Watson, 1997a, p. 85).
The social influence consideration thus appears to be a major force in the determination of
executive remuneration. This issue may be stronger in boards which lack the necessary
diversity to bring challenging debate to the issues of both director appointments and
director remuneration.
Finally it was found that the characteristics of the remuneration committee and corporate
governance variables such as, separation of chairman and CEO and board composition
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did not, overall, result in a stronger relationship between executive remuneration and
company performance.
This research was conducted mainly with the interests of shareholders in mind -hence the
frequent reference to corporate performance. It would be interesting to approach the
issues from a broader stakeholder basis. Doing so may require that one not only evaluate
the director in terms of the creation of shareholder value but also in terms of, for example,
his contribution to the development of employees, retention of skilled staff and the
contribution which the company has made to society. The latter issue is particularly
relevant in a developing country such as South Africa with its unique disparities amongst
its people.
There is currently an actual practical example of a company, in the financial services
industry, which has of linked executive remuneration to socio -political needs. The
company concerned will penalize its management in terms of a deduction from their
annual bonus payments for not attaining Employment Equity Act quotes amongst it
employees.
2.4.5. Nomination Committees
King 11 has recommended that companies establish nomination committees comprising
only non-executive directors. It also recommended that the chairmanship of the committee
should be with the chairman of the main board. This is a departure from King I which felt
that the nomination of directors should be the responsibility of the board as a whole. King I
was thus not in favour of establishing nomination committees.
Turning to the academic research on the issue of director selection one finds that there is
a great deal of empirical evidence which supports the contention that the control over the
selection and appointment of employees is a cheap, easy and efficient means used by
managers to build political coalitions. This has prompted numerous corporate governance
experts to conclude that CEO control over the director selection process constitutes a form
of management entrenchment. (Examples quoted by the authors Zajac &Westphal (1996)
include, Frederickson et aI, 1988, Lorsch & Mclver 1989, and Wade et aI, 1990).
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These issues were investigated further when Zajac & Westphal (1996) conducted research
on board appointments amongst Forbes and Fortune 500 companies in order to establish
whether any differences existed between the board appointments conducted by powerful
CEOs and those conducted by powerful boards. It was hypothesized by the authors that
the powerful CEO would seek to preserve his power and control by; firstly, avoiding the
appointment of director candidates who have participated in greater board control over
management and secondly, rather appointing directors whose experience on other boards
exhibited board passivity to management. Similarly, the authors hypothesized that
powerful boards were able to increase their control over management by avoiding passive
director appointments and, instead, appointing individuals with experience of boards
asserting control over management.
Zajac & Westphal(1996) utilised the following indicators of director's 'greater board control
experience', namely:
A prior board experience of increasing the ratio of non-executive to executive directors,
The separation of the positions of CEO and Chairman,
The decrease of corporate diversification,
The decrease of executive compensation
The decrease of CEO variable pay
As indicators of experience of board passivity the researchers relied on director
experience of the converse of the above experiences. For example, decreasing the ratio
of non-executive to executive directors, directors with board experience where the roles of
CEO and Chairman have recently been combined, etc.
The researchers found that directors who had prior experience on more passive boards
were significantly more likely to have subsequent appointments to passive boards or
"strong CEO" boards. These results were robust over all the indicators of increasing and
decreasing board control.
Finally the authors found that the positive relationship, identified by Farma (1980),
between the increasing attractiveness of the director in the market and the financial
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performance of the firm was only true for the subset of boards with high control over
management. This, the authors have concluded, seems to suggest that the reputational
effects of directors are more complex than previously thought (Zajac & Westphal 1999,
41 ).
As has been pointed out in the section on the establishment of remuneration committees
and the creation of a "balanced board", the role to be played by the nomination committee
is essential in ensuring good corporate governance. A study conducted by Conyon (1995)
in the United Kingdom found that only half of a sample of 298 companies had, at that time,
adopted nomination committees. The adoption of nomination committees appears to be
far more widespread in the United States with Monks and Minow (1995) reporting that 95%
of large US corporates rely on a nomination committee to make recommendations for
boardroom appointments.
2.4.6. Role of Institutional Shareholders
King /I expresses the view that institutional investors should play a more active and
transparent role in enforcing good corporate governance in the companies in which they
have invested. The committee is also of the view that the lack of shareholder activism in
South Africa "seriously undermines good levels of managerial compliance" (2002, 151, 7).
King /I also refers, with what seems to be approval, to a practice, which is developing
internationally in terms of which institutional shareholders who do not attend shareowners'
meetings of companies in which they have a certain minimum shareholding are censured.
The roles which institutional shareholders play in the companies in which they have
invested has received much academic interest, the research of which seems to indicate
that the issue is relatively complex, and that it may not be wise to force institutional
shareholders to play a more active role in the companies in which they have invested.
Pound (1988) presents three hypotheses, which, are based on the relationships between
the institutional investors and their incentives to intervene in corporate governance issues.
According to Pound it is the relationship between the institutional investor and the
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company which is most likely to influence the nature and extent of intervention. He has
according proposed three hypotheses to explain this role.
In terms of his Efficient Monitoring Hypothesis, institutional shareholders are more
informed and thus able to monitor management at lower costs than are small
shareholders. This hypothesis would suggest that there is a cost and efficiency
advantages to institutional investors enforcing corporate governance.
The above hypothesis as submitted needs to be reviewed since its inception. It may be
argued that in the 21 sI century - information age the discrepancy between institutional
shareholders and small private shareholders has diminished.
The Strategic Alignment Hypothesis holds that institutional investors and the board may
find it mutually advantageous to co-operate on certain issues. In sharp contrast, the
Conflict of Interest Hypothesis suggests that the institutional shareholders may, due to
current or future business dealings with the firm, be less willing to actively intervene and
limit management discretion.
The role that institutional shareholders are able to play in ensuring good governance was
recognized in the United Kingdom by the Cadbury Report (1992) where it was noted that,
"Because of their collective stake, we look to institutions in particular, with the backing of
the Institutional Shareholder's Committee, to use their influence as owners to ensure that
the companies in which they invested comply with the Code" (para. 6.16). The Cadbury
Report suggested that the market solution represented by more officious institutional
investors was actually preferred to regulation as a solution to poor corporate governance.
This view is supported by Hermes Investment Management Ltd, who in their Statement on
UK Corporate Governance & Voting Policy 2001 (2001) state that it is their belief that
"companies with concerned and involved shareholders are more likely to achieve superior
long-term returns than those without. Good stewardship creates value" (Hermes 2001,
p.1 ).
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It is not surprising that an Investment Manager, which has as its focus the investment of
pension fund money, has adopted this position. It is also worth noting that there are
contrary views to that which has been publicly adopted by Hermes.
As mentioned the second King Committee report is also supportive of institutional
shareholders playing a more active role in corporate governance. In fact an entire chapter
in the Compliance and Enforcement section of the report is devoted to "Encouraging
Shareholder Activism". The committee goes as far as to suggest that "sanctions should be
visited upon directors and the manager:nent of companies, notably institutional
shareowners, who fail to attend shareowners' meeting of the companies in which they are
invested" (King, 2002, 150).
Both Cadbury and King 11 seem to adopt the Efficient Monitoring Hypothesis as their main
support for the call for greater shareholder activism. What is not entirely clear to the
author is the extent to which greater shareholder activism is in keeping with the
Stakeholder Model or "inclusive approach" referred to in King 11. It may be that more
assertive shareholders, especially large financial institutions, may result in companies
which are more aligned to the interests of shareholders and less concerned about the
needs of other, equally important, stakeholders.
The research literature is divided on the likely success of placing higher governance
responsibilities on institutional shareholders and it is clear that the above
recommendations are largely at odds with the historical and current way in which many
institutional shareholders view themselves.
Hirschman (1970) for example, argues that institutional shareholders view themselves not
as shareholders who will hold the directors of the company accountable but rather as
holders of commodities, which they are easily able to sell -off should there be any sign of
concern over the value of their investment. Charkham (1990), points out that for
institutional shareholders to adopt a proactive monitoring role they need to view
themselves as co -owners of the companies in which they are investing and not merely as
holders of short term easily tradable commodities. Furthering this theme Charkham (1994)
refers to the, now widely articulated view, that the Anglo-American style capital market with
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its emphasis on liquidity and the division of institutional shareholders form the firms they
invest results in poor managerial supervision and neglect of the shareholder value
maximization approach. More recently, Short and Keasey (1997), correctly it is submitted,
state that due consideration should be given to the objectives of institutional shareholders
and their willingness and ability to govern corporations before one attempts to place
additional responsibilities on these institutions.
Taking the matter further, Short and Keasey (1997) suggest three reasons why institutional
shareholder may be more willing to exit problem companies rather than to attend to
improving governance. Firstly, if the institutional investor intervenes publicly they may
draw further public attention to the difficulties of the company. This may be perceived by
the market as bad news and may further reduce the investment holdings of the institutional
investor. Secondly, if they become involved in the management of such problem
companies they may become party to "insider information" which may impact on their
ability to trade in the shares of the company thus compounding potential losses. Finally,
the authors suggest that the costs associated with corporate governance monitoring a
diverse portfolio of shares are costly and may outweigh the benefits gained (Keasey,
p.28). This last argument is particularly powerful in the case of a short investment-holding
period.
It is thus suggested by the authors that the fund managers, and ultimate beneficiaries of
institutional funds may not be ideal monitors of corporate governance. The reasons for
this are that the institutional investment managers are motivated to achieve short-term
performance, which may often be at the expense of long-term corporate governance
considerations (Ibid p.23) In addition to this, one needs to consider well documented
economic phenomenon of the "free -rider". Corporate governance inevitability would
involve the individual institutional investor incurring costs. To the extent that other
institutional investors may also assume the role of monitoring governance, and the
benefits of such governance are share by all there may be a tendency for all institutional
investors to adopt a 'wait and see attitude', each waiting for the other to incur the costs of
added governance.
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According to the capital market theory of corporate governance, institutional shareholders
have a significant governance role to play in their ability to lead corporate takeovers of
under performing companies and in this way "firing" poor quality senior management. This
market for corporate control is seen by Jensen (1986) and Hart (1995) as the governance
mechanism of last resort, which is adopted when the internal mechanisms have failed.
The market for corporate control, and by implication the role of the institutional
shareholder, is not universally accepted as the most efficient form of corporate
governance. O'Sullivan (1997) referring to research studies spanning over four decades,
by numerous academics, has identified five criticisms of the corporate control model.
Firstly, the free rider problem referred to above exists in that the benefits of launching a
takeover bid weighed up against the costs may mean that shareholders are reluctant
launch such "disciplinary action". Secondly, an active market for corporate control may
lead to managers being too focused on short-term performance and neglecting long-term
investment opportunities. Thirdly, after takeovers implicit long term contracts, especially
contracts promoting investment in firm specific assets, adopted by the original
management are reneged upon as the new owners do not feel obliged to uphold such.
Fourthly, the takeover process may be manipulated by managers of the bidding firm for
their own agendas, for example entrenching themselves as indispensable, and even
commanding higher salaries. Finally, the large transaction costs associated with
takeovers mean that this mechanism remains a financially inefficient governance
mechanism of last resort.
O'Sullivan (1997) has also suggested that the numerous defensive strategies adopted by
management of the takeover target in order to often make the takeover financially unviable
also limit the efficiency of this as a governance mechanism.
According to O'Sullivan (1997) the research conducted in order to determine whether
takeover activity is a successful governance mechanism has focused on two measures.
Firstly an examination of the benefits to shareholder, in terms of share price movement
after the takeover and secondly, a comparison of accounting data before and after the
takeover. The author concludes that the research is inconclusive. Evidence does seem to
indicate that there is often change in management after a takeover but this in itself is not
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indicative of poor management being replaced as the research has not been able to
establish the motives for management turnover.
According to Jensen and Warner (1988) institutional shareholders are playing a greater
role than has been the case in the past in influencing the managers of under performing
firms, in which they have invested, to refocus the strategies which they have adopted.
According to Maug (1998) institutional shareholders in the United Kingdom and United
States are using their considerable influence to force companies to adopt shareholder
value maximizing strategies.
This research appears to contradict the studies conducted by Charkham (1994) and
seems to imply that "the voice option is becoming more popular than the exit option".
On the other .hand as was discussed in section 1.2 above, this increased "institutional
shareholder activism" may not necessarily mean that a stakeholder model of corporate
governance is not being followed. These shareholders may recognize, as Hill and Jones
(1992) have, that long-term shareholder value may be achieved in protecting and
balancing the interests of all stakeholders.
Adopting an Agency Model definition of corporate governance, Dockery et al (2000)
investigated the impact which institutional shareholders had on the strategies adopted by
managers of large European companies. It was found that the institutional shareholders
play a more active role in the management of the companies in which they have invested
than do companies in the United Kingdom. This has lead to management of European
companies adopting a longer-term view in their adoption of shareholder wealth maximizing
strategies.
Dockery et al conclude that there appears to be a reorientation of boards of directors to
shareholder interests (Ibid p. 25).
If this is indeed the trend in the United Kingdom and United States it is contrary to that
adopted by King 1/. Although the Stakeholder Model adopted by King 1/ may be suitable
for the socio-political environment in South Africa, one may surmise that, according to the
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findings of Dockery, it does not auger well for South Africa's ability to attract foreign
investment as foreign institutions will expect the shareholder's interests to be paramount to
those of other stakeholders.
The obvious counter to the research findings of Dockery is that corporations globally are
beginning to recognize the financial benefits of corporate social responsibility, although the
benefits may be of a longer-term nature. On the other hand it is also entirely likely that
these foreign investors may be less concerned with such considerations as they see
themselves as the holders of short-term tradable securities and not co-owners of the
company. This has increasing been the experience of emerging markets around the world
have of large institutional 'first world investors'.
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Chapter 3
Case Study Description and Results
3.1. Introduction
This section consists of a presentation of the research, which was conducted into the
corporate governance structures of six companies listed on the financial services sector of
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Initially it was believed that the research would be
conducted by drawing information from the annual reports of the sample companies. The
author, however, quickly established that this method of data collection would not be
successful because:
• It was difficult and time consuming to obtain financial statements for past financial
years
• The financial statements often failed to contain the data needed for the research
• The disclosure of the data was not consistent in terms of the detail required over all
the years of the study period
• The actual public disclosure of the data was not the main area of research because
the researcher was more interested in the existence of governance structures per
se.
Consequently, the companies were approached bye-mail questionnaire in order to provide
details of their corporate governance structures.
3.2. Sampling Strategy
A convenience based sampling strategy was utilised, as there was no need for a
scientifically based generalization of the research findings to the population parameter. In
addition to this, the cost and time requirements associated with a random sampling
technique were prohibitive. This inevitably led to the use of the simpler sampling strategy.
The researcher also felt that it may be more difficult to elicit responses from "penny stock
companies" and that the larger more well known public companies may be more receptive
to research into their corporate governance characteristics.
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The sample frame thus consisted of those companies listed on the financial services
sector of the JSE as at December 2001. This produced a list of forty companies. For the
companies to remain in the sample it was required that they had been listed at least since
1997. It was felt that this limitation would provide companies which are more likely to have
suitably complex governance structures in place which may have evolved through practical
experience. In order to further limit the sample size it was decided to select only those
companies whose share price exceeded 500c. This produced a sample of six companies
varying in size from 120 employees to 5 500 employees. The market capitalisation of
these companies ranged from R138 million to R 5 175 million (as at December 20001). It
was felt that the selection methodology had not introduced a size bias to the sample and
that, although not a probability based sample, it was felt that the sample was a relatively
fair reflection of the financial services sector of the JSE. (As opposed to the Banks
sector).
The final sample consisted of the following six companies:
• Alexander Forbes Ltd
• African Merchant Bank Holdings Ltd
• Brait South Africa Ltd
• Coronation Holdings Ltd
• PSG Holdings Ltd
• Sasfin Holdings Ltd
These companies were contacted between February 2002 and April 2002. In the first
instance, February 2002, the corporate secretarial departments of the companies were
contacted by means of e-mail and were given two weeks in order to reply. This resulted
in one response. A follow up e-mail was sent out in March 2002, which resulted in a
further three responses. At the end of March 2002 telephonic contact was made with the
non-respondents in order to establish the correct contact person and the willingness to
participate in the research. The reasons for this were as follows:
• There was no certainty that the e-mails had reached the correct people. (It was
discovered for instance that one of the respondents had been transferred to a
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subsidiary and was no longer employed in the corporate secretarial department. He
had delegated the task of reply to a colleague).
• In one case the e-mail reply had gone astray,
• Given the size of the sample and the fact that sample methodology was non-random in
nature it was felt that the additional and alternative means of contact would not add any
bias to the quality of the data.
The final e-mail questionnaire was sent out in the first week of April and all remaining
responses were received and collated by the end of the second week of April 2002.
(The researcher was aware of the fact that the Second King Committee report was
published on the 26 March and that this may have influenced the likelihood and detail of
the response of the remaining respondents. It was, however, felt that due to the objective
nature of the questionnaire, the closed questioning technique adopted and the sampling
methodology which had been adopted this influence would not have a material effect on
data quality).
The decision has been made not to disclose the identity of the above companies in the
following tabulations. The reason for this is that the author failed to expressly raise this
issue with the companies concerned. In addition not all the information that was gathered
was available in public records such as the companies' annual reports.
3.3. Case Study Findings
The responses of the six companies are examined in relation to each of the specific
governance structures. The overall findings indicate that the companies have very similar
governance structures and mechanisms in place.
3.3.1. Composition of the Board
In order to obtain the information required to evaluate the composition of the board each
company in the sample was asked to provide information on the number of executives and
non-executives on the main board in each of the years from 1999 to 2001. The companies
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were also asked to reflect whether the chairman of the board was an executive or non-
executive director of the company. Table 3.1 reflects the average numbers of directors on
the boards of each of the companies. These results indicate that, on average non-
executives where in the majority on the boards over the period of the study. The average
number of directors has remained relatively stable over the three-year period. The table
also indicates that, on average, the companies exceed the minimum requirement of three
non-executive directors as set by Cadbury (1992).
Ave. Board Composition Summary
Year 1999 2000 2001
Executives 4 3 4
Non -Executives 7 7 6
Ave. Board Size 12 10 10
Chair Exec. 1 1 0
Chair Non-exec. 5 5 6
Table 3.1
Proportion of Non-executive to Total Board
Company A B C D E F Ave.
Board Prop. 1999 0.47 0.71 0.55 0.63 0.75 0.71 0.64
Board Prop. 2000 0.75 0.64 0.58 0.50 0.79 0.71 0.66
Board Prop. 2001 0.56 0.54 0.58 0.43 0.80 0.71 0.60
Table 3.2
Table 3.2 indicates, for each of the companies over the study period, the extent to which
the non-executives in a given year where in the majority. Where the factor reflected in the
table is less that 0.50, it means that non -executives where in the minority. Conversely
factors greater than 0.50 indicate that the non-executives were in the majority. Apart from
company F, the board composition of companies varied thorough out the study period.
Companies A and D are the only companies which had a year in which the non-executives
were in the minority. It is surprising that company D as late as in 2001 had non-executives
in the minority. Company C consistently had a ratio of non-executive to overall board
composition below the average composition of the sample. Company E's board
composition in 2001 was 80% non-executive.
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These statistics do not reflect whether any of the non-executives were independent as
defined in King 11. The general trend gleaned from information obtained from some of the
companies indicates that few independent directors are ever appointed. The requirement
of independent directors is going to present a serious challenge to many companies.
Company E for example appears to have a large proportion of non-executive directors. In
reality though only 2 to 3 of these may qualify on the King 11 'independence test' as the
majority of the company's non-executives were executives in subsidiary companies of
company E.
3.3.2. Separation of Roles of CEO and Chairman
The companies were asked to indicate whether the same person in each of the years in
question had held the positions of CEO and Chairman. Table 3.3 indicates whether these
positions were held by two individuals (denoted in the "separate" column) or one individual




















As may be seen from this table the vast majority of companies had a clear separation of
the role of CEO and Chairman. Only one, and the same, company over the research
period reported that one individual occupied both positions. It is further interesting to note
that the company that combined the roles of CEO and Chairman was company E, which,
in table 3.2 had the highest proportion on non-executives to the overall board. The
practice of combining the roles of CEO and Chairman is discouraged in both King I and
King 11. Company E would have needed to provide reasons for he combination of the roles
in its annual financial reports for each of the years in question.
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3.3.3. Audit Committees
The companies were surveyed to establish whether they had an "audit committee
represented by board members and, if so, to then indicate the composition of the
committee". The companies were also asked to indicate whether the chairman of the
committee was an executive or non-executive.
Audit Comm. Proportion of Non-executive to Total Membership
Company A B C 0 E F
Board Prop. 1999 0.67 0.80 0.67 0.67 0.75 1.00
Board Prop. 2000 0.67 0.80 0.67 0.50 0.33 1.00
Board Prop. 2001 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.50 0.33 1.00
Table 3.4
Audit Committee Chairman
Year 1999 2000 2001
Executive 0 0 0
Non -Executive 5 5 5
Other 1 1 1






As may be seen from table 3.4 the almost all of companies had audit committees
comprised of a majority of non-executives. Company F had no executives present on its
audit committee. Company E is the only company that had a majority of executives
present on its audit committee during the years 2000 and 2001. Company E also reported
that the chairman of its audit committee was not a board member, this is indicated by the
"other" row in table 3.5. The position was, presumably held by a representative of the
company's external auditor. This would have added an element of independence to the
committee to, hopefully, balance the effect of the majority of executives on the committee.
3.3.4. Remuneration Committee
In determining the characteristics of the companies' remuneration committees, the same
questions posed in respect of the audit committee structure was phrased to apply to
remuneration committees.
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Given that this area of corporate governance is extremely controversial it was anticipated
that all six companies in the sample would have remuneration committees fully compliant
to King I and possibly even King 11.
Table 3.6 indicates that only company 0 had a remuneration committee comprised solely
of non-executives. If these non-executives were found to be independent of the company
this composition would be fully compliant to King 11 and Cadbury. Company O's main
board consisted of five non-executives in 1999, and three in 2000 and 2001. All these
non-executives also sit on the remuneration committee and it is highly unlikely that they
are all independent.
None of the companies had a majority of executives in their remuneration committees..
There appears to be no clear trend in the composition of remuneration committees over
the three-year period. Companies 0, F and C kept their committees unchanged while
companies A and B reduced the proportion of non-executives on their committees.
Company E, which in 1999 sported an executive as chairman of its committee actually
increased the number of non-executives.
Remuneration Comm. Proportion of Non-executive to Total Membership
Company A B C 0 E F Ave.
Board Prop. 1999 0.80 0.75 0.67 1.00 0.75 0.67 0.77
Board Prop. 2000 0.60 0.60 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.70
Board Prop. 2001 0.60 0.60 0.67 1.00 0.80 0.67 0.72
Table 3.6
Remuneration Committee Chair
Year 1999 2000 2001
Executive 1 0 0
Non -Executive 5 5 5
Other 0 1 1
Table 3.7
Table 3.7 illustrates whether each of the six companies in the sample had an executive
director or non-executive director chair their remuneration committee. As can be seen the
majority of companies in the sample had non-executive chairmen. Company E is the only
company that had an executive director chair the remuneration committee, this practice
changed during the years 2000 and 2001 when a non-board member was appointed as
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the chairman of the remuneration committee. (The non-board member chairman is
denoted in the "Other" row of table 3.3.4b).
King 11 requires that remuneration committees should consist entirely or mainly of
independent non-executives. This is going to require all of the companies in the sample to
change the composition of their respective committees.
3.3.5. Nomination Committees
This question was posed to establish whether, inspite of there being no requirement for
companies to form nomination committees, companies had taken a proactive stance and
established such committees in line with recommendations in the United Kingdom. It was
established that none of the companies had established nomination committees. Two of
the respondents however indicated being aware of such a recommendation in the King 11
report and indicated an intention to establish such a committee with a membership
structure identical to the company's existing remuneration committee during the course of
2002. These two companies were company A and company F.
3.3.6. Institutional Shareholder Representation
Of the six companies only company A indicated that institutional shareholders had been
represented on its board during the period concerned. This situation changed over the
period. Initially the shareholder representation fell away due to the group of subsidiary
companies unbundling. During the 1999 year however, the company again took on
institutional shareholder representatives, who were referred to by the company as "Black
Economic Empowerment non-executive directors".
The results obtained from the sample of companies were not of any use in analyzing the
effect that institutions may have on the corporate governance structures of the sample.
The research referred to in section 2.4.5 also indicates that institutional shareholders need
not be represented at board level in order to influence the corporate governance in the
companies in which they have invested.
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3.4 Summary
Overall it was found that all of the companies make extensive use of non-executive
directors. The number of directors has remained relatively stable over the three-year
study period. Generally non-executive directors are in the majority on the companies'
main boards and on the boards of sub-committees. It was not possible to establish
whether the non-executives were "independent directors" as defined in King 11. Such




Research Findings and Discussion
4.1. Introduction
This chapter is, with the support of existing research literature, a further evaluation of the
governance structures referred to King IJ and the actual structures identified in the sample
of companies discussed in chapter three. The intention is not to pay equal attention to
each of the governance structures investigated in the sample of companies but rather to
create meaning in how the structures relate to one another. There is a need to critically
address whether the actual introduction of governance structure in themselves are of any
benefit in promoting good governance.
4.2. Board Structure and the CEO
Fama & Jensen (1983a,b) conducted research into board structure and the impact of the
separation of the ownership and control. These authors were of the view that the where
there is a separation between the ownership and control, the costs associated with the
composition and control characteristics of the board (informational costs and
organizational costs) may only be minimized if there is a distinction drawn between the
actual initiation and implementation of decisions on the one hand, and the ratification and
monitoring of these decisions on the other hand. They suggest that the minimization of
agency costs can only occur if the responsibility for the ratification and monitoring of
decisions lies with the shareholders. This is because only the residual risk bearers should
be responsible for the evaluation of decisions because any costs associated with the
adopting inefficient strategies will be borne by the shareholders. The Fama and Jensen
model requires the board to be the representatives of the shareholders and independent of
the executives who would be responsible for the initiation and implementation of decisions.
The problem of combining the monitoring role of independent non-executives and the
decision implementation role of executives in one board is that the information available to
these two role players is asymmetrical. The non-executives are reliant on executives for
the provision of information and as such are at a disadvantage in the fulfillment of their role
as monitors. Jensen (1989) recognizes this problem in later work and actually questions
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whether independent non -executive directors who have no equity stake in the corporation
are, in practice, really able to control and discipline the very executive directors who have
nominated them to office and then supply them with the information required for them to
conduct their jobs. This criticism points to the need for an effective nomination committee,
an issue that has been identified by King 11 (2002), but which in has not received sufficient
emphasis. This is because in the "Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct" the
committee stipulated that "at a minimum, each board should have an audit and a
remuneration committee" (King, 2002, p.29). The King Committee should have recognized
that the need for an effective nomination committee is as essential as the need for an
Audit or remuneration committee.
The criticism one may level at the Farma and Jensen model is that it assumes that the
sole residual claimants are the shareholders. The model fails to recognize the existence
of employees, customers and society as equal stakeholders. (In other words the model
suffers the flaws of an Agency Model, as defined by Blair (1995). This is well recognized
in South Africa by King 11 and the modern regulatory environment. (For example South
Africa's progressive labour legislation). Farma and Jensen also fail to acknowledge that
the fact the owner -manager firms often have identical "stakeholder protecting" regulations
to comply to as firms where the roles of ownership and management are separate.
The ideal composition of the board is a complex issue and research seems to indicate that
a majority of independent non -executive directors will not necessarily result in the ideal
structure. Support for this is found in a study conducted by Byrd and Hickman (1992) in the
USA. In their study Byrd and Hickman investigated the impact of independent non-
executive directors on the tender offer bids, it was established that although shareholders
appeared to benefit from the presence of independent non-executive directors, there is a
diminishing benefit to shareholders when the proportion of non-executive directors
approaches 60%.
In the sample of companies investigated in this research (see table 3.2.) companies E and
F consistently had a proportion of non-executive in excess of 60% of the board. The
sample average non-executive board proportion was also above 60%.
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It is worth noting the current research did not identify the whether the non-executive
directors where independent (as defined in King 11) as it was felt that the complexity of the
definition would have caused confusion in the administration of the questionnaire. The
researcher has never-the -less established that very few of the non-executives in the
sample would actually qualify in terms of the. King 11 independence test. It is common
knowledge that South African companies often appoint retired executives to non-executive
board positions this, to the uninformed investor, creates the impression of balanced board,
when in fact one would find such non-executive not acting in a totally independent manner.
Although the establishment of the category of independent non-executive directors (as has
been recommended by King 11 ) may help to promote good corporate governance, the
manner in which these directors are be selected will ultimately play a very important role in
ensuring their independence and strength of character. In other words the success of
adding these independents is dependant largely on whether the nomination process,
which mayor may not take place through a nomination committee, is functioning correctly.
Research conducted by Kini et al (1995) into "disciplinary takeovers" of under performing
firms established that the effect such takeovers had on shareholder wealth seemed to be
related to the characteristics of the board of the under performing firm in that the under
performing firms appeared to have an unbalanced board with either too many independent
non-executives or too may executives. The unbalanced mix was addressed soon after
each takeover.
It would thus seem that it is possible to have too many independent non-executives.
Hermes (2001) has, in its code, devoted an entire section to the role of the senior non-
executive directors. It stated that it supports the combining of the roles of independent
deputy chairman and senior non-executive director. The senior non-executive director's
main job is to chair as many of the board sub-committees as possible. According to
Hermes the senior independent non-executive director should also have the authority to
call a meeting of the non-executive directors. King 11 (2002, 57, 9) has also approved the
practice of appointing a senior non-executive director by suggesting that South African
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boards should consider this in circumstances where there is conflict between the board
members or the chairman needs assistance in fulfilling his tasks.
Although the need for a senior non-executive may be necessary in certain circumstances,
for example where the GEO is an extremely forceful individual and the non-executive
directors are relatively inexperience, it may not be beneficial to have such an appointment
in all cases. It may not be wise to appoint a senior non-executive if this is merely going to
lead to an unbalanced board, by 'substituting' one "controlling" individual viz. the GEO with
a senior non-executive.
Research conducted into board composition and the possible impact, which this may have
on corporate performance, has helped to categorize earlier research paradigms. Zajac &
Westphal (1996), for instance, have identified three streams of research on the retention
and selection of directors.
The first stream is characterized by research into the extent to which boards are passive
tools of management interests. This stream is grounded in organizational behaviour and
according to the authors is concerned with the balance of non -executive to executive
directors and the separation of the roles of chief executive officer and chairman of the
board. This line of research concludes that composition of the board is determined largely
by the powerful individual GEOs who co-opt existing directors and influence the retention
of existing directors who are more likely to be supportive of the interests of the GEO (Zajac
& Westphal, 1996).
There thus appears to be clear justification for the recommendation that the appointment
of directors should be under the control of the non -executive directors. The question one
needs to ask though is the extent to which the GEO is able to influence the non -
executives in spite of his non -attendance on the nomination committee.
The second stream of research identified by the above authors is aimed at analyzing the
macro structure of the board and the impact of interlocking directorships on the
relationships between the organizations (Zajac & Westphal, 1996).
The third perspective is based on the agency view of boards as generally effective yet
imperfect at serving shareholder interests (Fama, 1980). In terms of this financial
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economics perspective the directors attempt to develop and maintain a favourable
reputation as active promoters of shareholder interests in an attempt to gain approval for
appointments on other boards thus benefiting from their human capital.
King 11 (2002) has made recommendations that rely on the financial economic perspective
of the director. In the section on "Compliance and Enforcement" the committee proposes
that a register of delinquent directors be established and which is to be maintained by the
Registrar of Companies and disclosed on its website. (147, 7.1). The thinking is that "peer
pressure can then be exerted by organized business and the financial press against
delinquent directors" (152, 4).
This suggestion will only succeed in an environment that is entirely free of protectionism
and non-threatening reciprocal arrangements.
4.3. Remuneration Committees
Although the samples are not very comparable the results set out in chapter three above,
compare very favourably, from a good governance point of view, with those in the research
conducted by Ezzamel & Watson (1997a). Executive directors dominated the boards
surveyed by Ezzamel & Watson. The CEO and chairman were also not separate
individuals in 23% of their sample. In 33% of the cases the chairman was a member of the
remuneration committee. Non-executive directors chaired only 47% of companies in the
Ezzamel & Watson sample (p. 78 -79).
Although there is a space of four years between the research of Ezzamel & Watson and
the South African sample is very small, it is pleasing to note that in the sample of six
companies, except for one company in 1999, all companies had non-executives chairing
their remuneration committee. Once again the true independence of the non-executive
chairman was not established. King 11 is unambiguous in its recommendation that
independent non-executives should be in the majority of the remuneration committee and
that an independent non-executive should hold the chairmanship.
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The role of independent non-executive chairmen in remuneration committees may be
questioned in the South African context of "collegialism" on the basis of the "strong social
influence considerations" Ezzamel & Watson (1997a). In South Africa it is possible that
many of the non-executive directors sit on each other's remuneration committees. There
may thus be a vicious circle or feedback loop in this exclusive club which has the effect of
establishing an upward spiraling level of remuneration. King 11 has not addressed the
concerns around reciprocal arrangements that may exist in the ranks of directors. It is
entirely possible in the South African context of interlocking directorships and institutional
shareholdings that reciprocal arrangements will exist between directors which, in effect,
thwart the true independence of the non-executive directors and result, for example, in a
"bidding up" of directors remuneration.
In this environment any recommendations on governance structures will also not do much
to improve the level of governance or keep executive remuneration in check.
One consolation is that this trend is not entirely unique to South Africa. The trend of
reciprocal beneficial independent non-executive directorships has been identified by
Ezzamel & Watson in their research in the United Kingdom and was referred to by these
researchers as the "cosy collusion" between directors (1997a. p.71).
4.4. Structures Not Necessarily the Answer
Bruce and Buck (1997) in their research into executive remuneration make the useful
distinction between those institutional or structural measures that aim to ensure goal
congruence between shareholders and management, and those measures that are
specific to the executive's employment contract. In short, examples of the former would
include the appointment of independent non-executive directors, establishment of
remuneration committees and the separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive
officer. An example of the latter would be the introduction of well-researched executive
stock options. Bruce and Buck (1997) are sceptical about the success of structural
mechanisms in ensuring goal alignment. The researchers conclude that the privileged
access which the executives have to company information, their control over non-
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executive board appointment, and the "outsider" status of institutional shareholders as the
major barriers to effective governance systems.
It is also worth noting that the recommendations of King 11 and the recommendations of
committees in the United Kingdom are all primarily focussed on, to use Pettigrew and
McNulty's (1995) words, "rules, regulations, institutional practises and structures which
provide a framework for managerial accountability". These attempts at ensuring good
governance do not address the actual behavioural dynamics and attitudes of independent
non-executive directors. In many respects these latter ingredients are as import to good
governance as the structural issues.
4.5 Summary
There appear to be differing opinions on whether or not corporate governance structures
really do achieve the objectives behind their introduction. King 11 has called for a greater
role to be played by independent non-executive directors. If the recommendations of King
11 are to be believed, these independent directors will play an important role in balancing
the interests of all stakeholders. Research has, however shown that once a certain
proportion of non-executive directors in reached on the board the benefits of having these
directors present is no longer achieved. There is also research, which indicates that
where an "unbalanced board" exists this is often identified by institutions, which acquire





A great distinguishing feature of King 11 (2002) is that the committee has not only made
recommendations on governance structures and principles but that it has also devoted
much time to an investigation of the enforcement of these structures and principles. The
following recommendations are drawn from both King 11 and the academic research
referred to above.
5.2 Recommendations
Corporate Governance is not a piecemeal exercise. The broader benefits of good
governance and the enhancement of shareholder value are only enjoyed when all the
characteristics of good governance are adhered to on a continuous basis. Corporate
governance is thus, in the opinion of this author, more about the attitude of leadership and
motives behind decisions as opposed to ensuring that the company is managed by means
of prescribed structures. The structures are designed to ensure that mechanisms exist
which would support thorough debate, transparency and the correct decisions by people
who hopefully have the right attitude and pure motives.
This is recognised in King 11 (2002) by the quotation of The Business Roundtable, USA:
U ••• the substance of good governance is more important that its form; adoption of a
set of rules or principles or of any particular practice or policy is not a substitute for,
than does not itself assure, good corporate governance" (2002, 142).
The overall philosophy adopted by King 11 is, as has been demonstrated, based on the
Stakeholder Model of corporate governance. This has resulted in an extremely
comprehensive report that is certainly in line with modern business management theory.
Of course, the big danger of adopting such an approach is that the accountability of
management to everyone may in fact lead to the ultimate accountability of management to
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no one. This has been recognised by King 11 in that the committee has emphasised the
role to be played by institutional shareholders in the enforcement of the corporate
governance code. Whether shareholders will actually fulfil this role is not entirely certain.
The research conducted in the United Kingdom indicates that institutional shareholders are
loath to involve themselves in management of the companies in which they have invested.
On the other hand, many institutional investors (Hermes Investment Management being
the but one of many quoted in this dissertation) are beginning to codify what they expect of
the management of the companies in which they are investing. In South Africa we have
not seen institutional shareholders adopt a public stance on the level of governance that
they expect from the companies in which they invest. King 11 has specifically referred to
these institutions and has recommended that investment analysts investigate the extent to
which companies have complied with the recommendations of King 11 before deciding to
invest in such companies (2002, 143).
A recommendation that has also been made is that a "rating agency" be established in
South Africa in order to publicly measure and compare the compliance of relevant
companies to King 11. Although certain South African accounting firms have made
attempts at this the author's view is that there is not large-scale support for these "in-
house" initiatives. What is required is the establishment of an entirely objective institution
such as Demicor Rating, which operates throughout Europe and bases its solicited rating
scale on that of the International Corporate Governance Network, the World Bank Code
and code of the OECD (Caprasse, 2001). This South African body should be funded by
either the JSE or corporate South Africa and should then, in the author's opinion, have a
greater chance of success.
King 11 has correctly pointed out that to include such a body within the JSE would limit its
jurisdiction to listed companies only whereas the actual code has been compiled to apply
equally to large privately held companies. Given this limitation the Registrar of Companies
may be the correct body to assume the role of "rating agency" this would certainly fit neatly
with the King 1I recommendation that this government department should maintain a
register of delinquent directors. For this to be possible the government would need to
spend a huge amount on the resourcing the office of the Registrar. This could easily be
56
funded by a once of levy on all South African corporations which have, for example, more
than 50 employees or are publicly listed companies.
In addition to the South African educational system should be greater attention, at
secondary and tertiary level, to the education of South African school children on the roles
of various stakeholders in the modern corporation. This shareholder education
programme should ultimately encourage South Africa's individual shareholders to play a
more active role in companies in which they have invested. This it is felt is particularly
important given the recent demutualisation of Old Mutual and Sanlam, which created
thousands of first time shareholders, and the increased ease, often electronically, with
which the average South African is able to invest in JSE listed companies.
Finally the issue of cross-directorships, which create the potential for "cosy collusion",
should be formally addressed within South Africa. This problem, as has been indicated
above, is not unique to South Africa but may be far worse in South Africa than in the
western world due to South Africa's many years of isolation. This isolation, it is submitted,
has resulted in a few large financial institutions, and by analogy, individuals controlling a
huge number of South African corporations in both an executive and non-executive
capacity. The manner to address this issue is to limit the number of directorships which
individuals are entitled to hold and to restrict individuals from holding cross directorships.
5.3 Conclusion
South Africa probably has the most progressive and inclusive corporate governance code
in the world. This is a remarkable achievement if one considers that all this has taken
place in over a period of less than a decade. The current socio-political environment,
including legislation aimed at addressing the inequalities of the past and disparity in
wealth, should serve to further broaden the involvement of all South Africans in matters of
national interest such as corporate governance. South Africa's rich cultural diversity and
the inclusive philosophy of 'Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu' should ensure that in the long
term the interests of shareholders and all other stakeholders are balanced to the benefit of
all. In order to ensure the above corporate South Africa should play a more active role in
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educating South Africans on basic corporate governance principles and the roles and
responsibilities of stakeholders in the corporate world.
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